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ABSTRACT:    The complexity of the relationship between society and the environment is recognized by researchers and 
practitioners as a major challenge. This article examines how the type of political regime, the degree of political 
freedom and civil rights, and the level of income concentration relates to environmental performance as 
measured by the Environmental Performance Index (EPI). The analysis is based on a sample of 161 countries 
and covers the period 2007-2016, using a fixed effects panel data model. Our findings suggest that democracy 
as a political regime does not necessarily induce greater commitment to environmental issues. Lower income 
inequality offers the same results. However, a positive association was found between the expansion of rights 
and freedoms and the EPI, suggesting that freer countries tend to have better   environmental performance. 
Given the multiplicity of profiles in terms of the nature and depth of democracy and inequality, our study 
suggest parsimony with more generalist analyses.
                            Keywords: democracy; freedom; civil rights; inequality; environmental performance.
RESUMO:        A complexidade das relações entre sociedade e meio ambiente é reconhecida por pesquisadores e técnicos 
como um grande desafio. Este artigo examina como o tipo de regime político, o grau de liberdade políticas 
e direitos civis e o nível de concentração de renda se relaciona com a performance ambiental medida pelo 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI). A análise é baseada em uma amostra de 161 países e cobre o período 
de 2007-2016, utilizando um modelo de dados em painel de efeitos fixos. Nossos achados sugerem que 
democracia como um regime político não necessariamente induz maior comprometimento com questões 
ambientais. Menor desigualdade de renda oferece os mesmos resultados. Entretanto, foi encontrada uma 
relação positiva entre a expansão dos direitos e liberdades e o EPI, sugerindo que países mais livres tendem a 
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ter melhor performance ambiental. Dada a multiplicidade de perfis em termos da natureza e profundidade da 
democracia e desigualdade, nosso estudo também sugere parcimônia com análises mais generalistas.
                            Palavras-chave: democracia; liberdade; direitos civis; desigualdade; performance ambiental.
1. Introduction
In recent decades, the social and natural scien-
ces have developed a wide range of perspectives on 
the effects of anthropic activity on the environment. 
In addition to widely investigated economic aspects 
such as income, economic activity (Grossman & 
Krueger, 1991; 1995; Shafik & Bandyopadhyay, 
1992; Panayotou, 1993; 2016) and inequality 
(Borguesi, 2006; Jorgueson, et al., 2016), different 
domestic and international political arrangements 
seem to be related to a variety of levels and types 
of engagement with environmental protection 
(Dryzek, 1987; Congleton, 1992; Downey & Strife, 
2010).
Environmental problems, which governments 
generally assign low priority, require plural and 
multifaceted solutions that often take longer to take 
effect than actions on other dimensions (Povitkina, 
2018a; 2018b). Thus, given their complexity for 
decision makers, there has been growing interest in 
analyzing the role of democracy and political insti-
tutions in maintaining the public goods associated 
with natural environments (Midlarsky, 1997; 1998; 
Li & Reuveny, 2006; Buitenzorgy & Mol, 2011).
This study examines the empirical relationship 
between income inequality, features of democracy, 
and environmental performance in a set of countries 
around the world. It assesses the effects that the type 
of political regime, the degree of political freedom 
and civil rights, and the level of income concen-
tration have on the performance of established 
environmental policies in the countries. In this 
context, the central question to be investigated here 
is whether it is reasonable to say that democratic, 
free, and egalitarian societies are more committed 
to the environment.
Due to the nature of the approach, the theoreti-
cal scope, and the variables used, this study contri-
butes to three aspects. Regarding the environmental 
dimension, it innovates by using a multidimensional 
environmental performance variable that aggregates 
elements related to both human health and the vita-
lity of ecosystems, the Environmental Performance 
Index (EPI). From a theoretical perspective, it pro-
vides an advance by jointly analyzing the role of 
income inequality and democracy in the context of 
environmental quality.  It also contributes by consi-
dering democracy jointly from two perspectives: as 
an institutionalized political regime, and the degree 
of civil liberties and rights - which is done using 
two composite indices.
The following section presents the theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence found in the 
literature that discusses the relationship between 
inequality, democracy, and the environment. The 
next section describes the methodological approach 
adopted, detailing the statistical method and the 
databases. After that, the next section discusses 
the results found in relation to those reported in the 
literature. Finally, the last section presents the main 
conclusions regarding the proposed relationship, 
as well as the limitations of the study and future 
propositions.
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2. Inequality, democracy and the 
environment
Since the 1990s, the body of literature on the 
interconnections between development and the en-
vironment has grown considerably. Research into 
the relationship between income and environmental 
degradation is one of the most classic strands of this 
debate. Among the most important contributions 
are the preliminary studies by Grossman & Krueger 
(1991; 1993; 1995; 1996), who, borrowing from 
Kuznets (1955) research on the relationship between 
economic growth and income distribution (known 
as Kuznets Curve) expanded the initial proposal by 
considering environmental issues. In doing so, they 
sought to understand if economic growth is always 
harmful to the environment or if the increasing we-
alth and income eventually results in a mitigation of 
environmental problems.
These authors, as well as Panayotou (1993), and 
more recently Andreaoni & Levinson (2001), Dinda 
(2004), Carson (2009) and Panayotou (2016), found 
that the relationship between some pollutants and in-
come growth was represented by an inverted U-sha-
ped curve known as the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC). According to the arguments presented 
in their studies, the curved shape arises because in the 
early stages of development, when economic activity 
is most intense, the pressure on the environment 
inevitably grows sharply, then slows down, and later 
reaches a tipping point. From this stage on, as per 
capita income grows, there are incentives to reduce 
the impact on the environment. This trend is said to 
occur because the relationship between income and 
degradation is linked to a more significant demand 
for stricter environmental policies and standards, so 
that higher income levels are positively associated 
with better environmental outcomes.
The main suggestion of the EKC hypothesis is 
that the natural course of economic growth would 
eventually induce environmental improvements and 
therefore can be considered a solution to environmen-
tal degradation. However, as pointed out by Gross-
man and Kruger (1995), the proposed relationship 
cannot be understood as  automatic or deterministic.
With a similar aim, to investigate the socioeco-
nomic factors that affect environmental degradation, 
Boyce (1994) questioned whether greater vigilance 
with environmental issues is directly associated with 
income level, as the EKC hypothesis suggests, or if 
there is also a relationship with the political process. 
His contributions are central to this debate, especially 
because they suggest, based on microeconomic the-
ory, that the optimal social decision between demand 
and environmental quality is weighted by the power 
of certain social groups, what he calls the “Power-
-Weighted Social Decision Rule”. 
For Boyce (1994), the inequality of power and 
income existing between different groups in society is 
the key to understanding this relationship. According 
to his proposed theoretical model, the social ideal 
would be reached at the point where the level of de-
gradation maximizes the net social benefit. However, 
when inequality is taken into account, i.e. when the 
maximization of benefits and their distribution is 
weighted by the power of individuals (in terms of 
wealth and political power), this balance tends to 
benefit the “winners”. They obtain greater levels of 
net benefits by not bearing the costs of degradation if 
they are producers, or by having access to low-priced 
goods and services if they are consumers (Boyce 
1994; Torras & Boyce 1998).
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In this sense, when the beneficiary group has 
more power than the others, who suffer the envi-
ronmental costs, the social ideal is inefficient from 
the point of view of reducing degradation. This is 
because a positive correlation is found between 
benefit and power, suggesting that the “winners” 
are less vigilant when it comes to reducing environ-
mental damage. Consequently, greater inequality is 
associated with greater degradation (Boyce, 1994; 
2003; 2007; Boyce, et al., 1999).
These hypotheses were empirically tested in 
the study by Torras & Boyce (1998), which inves-
tigated the relationship between changes in income 
distribution and changes in pollution levels in several 
countries in the early 1990s. For these authors, the 
distribution of power between social groups was key 
to understanding this association. The results suggest 
that the unequal distribution of power, represented 
by a higher concentration of income, lower levels of 
education, political freedom and civil rights, would 
tend to increase the environmental damage generated 
by economic activities. This is because those indi-
viduals considered “winners” would have greater 
access to the surplus that would be generated by not 
incorporating the cost of environmental degradation 
into the final price of goods and services.
Baek & Gweisah (2013), Jorgenson, et al. 
(2016; 2017), Kasuga (2017), Knight, et al. (2017) 
and Kashwan (2017), despite employing different 
statistical methods, found similar results. On the other 
hand, Ravallion, et al. (2000), Borghesi (2006) and 
Grunewald, et al. (2017) found evidence to confirm 
and refute Boyce’s hypotheses. In general, the latter 
authors emphasized that the relationship between in-
equality and environmental quality depended on both 
the variables analyzed and the scale of the analysis.
The relationship between sustainability and 
inequality was also investigated by Scruggs (1998), 
who pointed out some problems with the premises 
adopted in the studies by Boyce and his colleagues. 
According to Scruggs (1998), Boyce’s hypothesis on 
equality fails in two respects: in considering that per 
capita income is linearly related to environmental 
degradation, and in assuming that collective and 
democratic social decision-making provides the best 
solutions to environmental problems. 
For Scruggs (1998), richer and more powerful 
individuals would not necessarily prefer greater 
degradation, thus assuming that a positive correla-
tion between income and degradation would be 
misleading. According to his findings, the impact of 
income inequality varied according to the environ-
mental indicator used, so he was unable to confirm 
the hypothesis of equality in any general sense. In 
general, the results of his research indicated that 
global environmental performance was more closely 
associated with income level, as in the classical eco-
nomic approaches, than with the effects of inequality 
advocated by Boyce.
The findings of Holts-Eakin & Selden (1995) 
and Heerink, et al. (2001) are in line with Scruggs’ 
arguments. For example, the previous authors pro-
vided evidence that degradation varied with income 
level and could even decrease at higher income levels 
when richer individuals allocated less of their inco-
me to consumption. On the other hand, Heerink, et 
al. (2001) argued that in the short to medium term, 
income redistribution could contribute to a reduction 
in environmental protection because the propensity 
to consume degrading intensive goods and services 
would tend to increase, increasing the propensity to 
degrade.
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The ensuing debate on power and income ine-
quality opened the door for further discussions that 
included issues related to the institutional and politi-
cal system of societies. As a result, interest emerged 
in assessing how decision-making on environmental 
issues could be related to the type of political regi-
me. Researchers sought to understand, for example, 
whether democracy was beneficial or harmful to the 
environment and in what contexts this association 
took place (Farzin & Bond, 2006; Scruggs, 2009; 
Downey, 2015; and Povitkina 2015, 2018a, 2018b).
In Schumpeter’s (2010) conceptions of classical 
theory, democracy is understood as a system in which 
an institutional arrangement is used “for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote.” (Schumpeter, 2010, p. 269). 
Thus, as a political regime, democracy is understood 
as a system of selecting politicians or, as Mill (1861) 
suggests, as a form of government whose social 
rules and decisions are conducted by an authorized 
representative, according to the principle of “repre-
sentative democracy”. Moreover, it is associated with 
the level of political power distributed in a given 
society, that is, “the ability of individuals and groups 
to influence the decision of the society” (Bollen & 
Paxton, 1997, p.15).
Over the centuries, democracy has been widely 
associated with ideas and principles, such as civil 
rights and political and social freedoms - which 
are some of the basic principles attributed to libe-
ral democracy. However, as Cunningham (2009) 
points out, Political Science presents different libe-
ral-democratic theories that are guided by different 
conceptions about the value of democracy, about 
how democratic societies should function, and even 
about the semantics of the meaning of the word 
itself. Therefore, understanding democracy as a 
political regime and what it represents as an idea is 
increasingly complex.
According to Midlarsky (1997; 1998), despite 
the complexities of the concepts of inequality and 
democracy, several fields of science have investigated 
the relationship between these two aspects. In the 
environmental sphere, the level of participation of 
political institutions and the performance of gover-
nments has become points of debate associated with 
some observed environmental outcomes, fueling the 
discussion about what policies should be adopted in 
relation to the environment.
According to Congleton (1992), political ins-
titutions influence degradation (positively or nega-
tively) according to the extent to which they direct 
environmental policy and economic growth. Thus, 
the measures adopted by the political regime have a 
direct relationship with environmental performance.
The studies conducted by Smith (2003), Bät-
tig & Bernauer (2009), Bernauer & Koubi (2009), 
Buitenzorgy & Mol (2011), Povitkina, et al. (2015) 
highlighted the existence of a positive association 
between political regime (as a proxy for “power”) 
and the environment, based strictly on the concept 
of democracy. As argued by Povitkina (2015; 2018a; 
2018b) and Congleton (1992), this association would 
tend to occur mainly because a democratic system, 
where politicians are elected in free and competitive 
elections, would seek to get as close as possible to 
the aggregate preferences and interests of the average 
citizen. Therefore, policies would tend to meet the 
demand of the majority, as opposed to decision-
-making in an autocratic regime, where the interests 
of a non-representative elected group are prioritized.
On the other hand, according to Olson (1993) 
and McGuire & Olson (1996), non-democratic socie-
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ties are governed by a small portion of the so-called 
“elite” population, whose primary concern is to 
increase its personal wealth and serve its individual 
interests. Thus, if the opportunity cost associated with 
providing of the public good is under the control 
of the “elite”, environmental quality would tend to 
enjoy less prestige.
Furthermore, in autocratic regimes the flow of 
information is more limited, given the greater control 
exercised over the media. Thus, decision making is 
less participatory and more autonomous (Li & Reu-
veny, 2006). On the other hand, democratic societies 
have greater respect for freedom of expression and 
encourage the dissemination of information, leading 
to greater awareness of environmental problems 
and encouraging greater scrutiny of environmental 
legislation (Schultz & Crocket, 1990; Payne, 1995).
However, Midlarsky (1998) points out that 
most of the above arguments are based on an idea-
lization of democracy. That is, they ignore the fact 
decision making can be conducted within a scenario 
of competition between different social groups that 
fighting each other at the legislative and executive 
levels of government power. An example of this is 
the antagonisms presented between corporations 
and environmental groups. Given this context, a 
democratic regime may be far from ideal in terms 
of its role in carrying out pro-environmental public 
policies, since environmental problems affect diffe-
rent social groups in different ways. Thus, democracy 
may not be efficient for the purposes environmental 
protection.
A similar argument is supported by the perspec-
tive highlighted in the “Tragedy of the Commons”, 
where Hardin (1968) emphasized that the excess 
of freedom and individualism, generally observed 
in democratic societies, would result in further en-
vironmental degradation. According to him, only a 
collective effort would lead to an improvement in the 
quality of the environment. Thus, he argues that in 
undemocratic regimes coercive power could induce 
a reduction in degradation by diminishing individual 
freedoms and controlling access to public goods.
Research such as that by Dryzek (1987) and 
Midlarsky (1998) is in line with these arguments, su-
ggesting that capitalist democracies tend to prioritize 
the market economy and the performance of corpo-
rations whose economic interests prevail, reducing 
the scope for action on environmental issues. This is 
because the interest of such groups is mainly based 
on maximizing profit and their individual gains. 
The debate presented here stands out due to 
the heterogeneity of the arguments and approaches 
adopted when exploring the influence of power and 
income on anthropogenic environmental pressure. 
While the discussion of the impact of these two 
dimensions is important, it is necessary a priori, to 
define power, democracy and equality. This study 
seeks to understand the temporal dynamics of this 
relationship from two complementary views on de-
mocracy and a broader framework of environmental 
indicators.
3. Method and data 
This paper investigates the association between 
political regime, degree of political freedom and 
civil rights, and level of income inequality with the 
performance of environmental policies established 
worldwide. For this purpose, information was collec-
ted from 161 countries in a 10-year period, covering 
the period 2007-2016. After that, the database consis-
ted of 1,930 observations and included 8 variables. 
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Countries for which  information on the key variables 
was not available were excluded from the database.
The Environmental Performance Index (EPI), 
prepared by the universities of Yale and Columbia, 
was adopted as the environmental variable. This 
same variable has been used in similar studies, such 
as Nekooei, et al. (2015) and Telle (2015). The EPI 
was chosen because it provides a means of more fully 
analyzing a country’s environmental performance 
based on a set of environmental indicators, rather than 
focusing the analysis on outcome variables, such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, for example. Therefore, 
EPI as an indicator of environmental  quality and 
performance can offer a greater relationship between 
spending capacity and the efforts made by countries 
to improve environmental sustainability, in various 
spheres.
The EPI ranks the performance of countries on 
environmental issues related to protecting human 
health and protecting of ecosystems. Structurally, it 
has two distinct objectives, environmental health and 
ecosystem vitality, which are comprised of more than 
20 indicators. The environmental health information 
measures the protection of human health against 
environmental damage, while the ecosystem vitality 
data measures ecosystem protection and natural re-
source management. The scores range from 0 to 100, 
and the closer to 100, the better the countries perform 
against the targets for each indicator (Wendling et al. 
2019; Hsu and Zomer, 2016). The final EPI score 
was used as the dependent variable for the proposed 
econometric model.
The Gini Index extracted from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID)1, in its 
latest update (Solt, 2017), was chosen as the variable 
to represent inequality. This variable is widely used 
in the literature due to the lack of comparable data 
over time for a large set of countries (Knight, et al. 
2017; Grunewald, et al. 2017). The Gini was calcu-
lated based on disposable income (after taxes and/
or transfers). The index ranges from 0 to 100, with 
0 representing total equality and 100 representing 
absolute inequality. Although currently Gini may be 
questionable as the best measure of inequality, we 
chose to use it so that we could compare the results 
generated (at a certain level) with studies that debate 
the same topic, in order to allow for a closer dialogue.
Two variables, the Polity IV index and the Fre-
edom House Index were chosen for the dimension 
of democracy. This allowed us to evaluate the role 
of democracy in the environmental context from two 
perspectives: considering democracy as an institutio-
nalized political regime and considering democracy 
as a level of freedom and political and civil rights 
within a society.
The main reason for adopting this bi-variable 
composition was the understanding, previously dis-
cussed above in the theoretical framework, that the 
concept of democracy is broad and complex. The 
use of two variables, with different focuses, seems 
to provide a more reasonable chance of capturing 
the realities of countries with diverse profiles. While 
some may be democratic and have higher levels of 
freedom, others may be considered democratic but 
do not enjoy the same level of freedom. The central 
hypothesis regarding this issue is that the various 
patterns expressed by the combination of the two 
variables are associated with different environmental 
performances.
1 Those data can be accessed at http://fsolt.org/swiid/
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 Polity IV captures information about the 
quality of government institutions, considering 
a “governmental spectrum”  ranging from fully 
institutionalized democratic regimes to mixed or 
anocratic2 regimes and fully institutionalized au-
tocracies. The final result takes the form of a score 
on a 20-point scale, ranging from -10 (for cases of 
hereditary monarchy) to +10 (for cases of a fully 
consolidated democracy). The Polity IV score can 
also be analyzed in terms of regime categories: au-
tocracies (from -10 to -6), anocracies (from -5 to +5) 
and democracies (from +6 to +10) (Marshall et al. 
2002, pp. 1-16). For the present study, the scale was 
changed to 0 to 20, so that the higher the score, the 
greater the degree of institutionalized democracy.
The Freedom House Index (FHI) differs from 
Polity IV in that it is used to the political freedoms 
and civil rights of individuals within each nation. 
Thus, while Polity IV characterizes the country 
according to the type of political regime, the FHI 
indicates the aggregate degree of freedoms and 
rights within the country3. Structurally, the index 
includes 25 indicators, 10 corresponding to the 
“political rights” category and 15 corresponding to 
“civil liberties”. The country status is determined 
based on the aggregated scores: from 1 to 2.5 is 
“Free”, from 3.0 to 5.0 is “Partly Free” and from 
5.5 to 7.0 is “Not Free” (Freedom House, 2018).
In addition to the two explanatory variables 
listed; some control variables commonly used in 
similar studies to minimize endogeneity issues 
were included: i) percentage of rural population; 
ii) population density (in km²); iii) per capita GDP 
based on purchasing power parity; iv) industry value 
added (as % of GDP), iv) Human Development 
Index (HDI) and v) tax revenue (as % of GDP) 
as a proxy for state size, to capture some effect of 
state capacity on environmental issues. Scruggs 
(2009), Jorgenson, et al. (2017) and Povitkina 
(2018) also used some of these variables because 
they consider multidimensionality a strong factor 
in the relationship between inequality, democracy, 
and the environment.
Control variables i, iii and iv were collected 
directly from the World Bank Open Data repository. 
Variable ii was calculated based on the total number 
of inhabitants of each country in relation to its area 
(in km²), which were also collected from the World 
Bank. Finally, variables v and vi were respectively 
extracted from the databases of the United Nations 
Development Program and the International Mo-
netary Fund.
3.1. Econometric model
To analyze the proposed relationship, a fixed 
effects panel data econometric model was designed. 
Prior to applying the model, a Hausman test was 
conducted to determine if the fixed effects model 
was the most suitable for the purposes of this rese-
arch. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicated 
its suitability.
Since each country has individual time-inva-
riant characteristics, this effect needs to be removed, 
which panel models can do. According to Cameron 
& Trivedi (2010), fixed effect models aim to control 
2 A democratic political regime that has features of a dictatorship or when there is intense political instability that makes the regime neither 
democratic nor autocratic (Vreeland, 2008).
3 For further understanding of how “freedom” and “right’ are being addressed here, visit https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-free-
dom-world-2019
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for effects associated with omitted variables among 
individuals, but invariant in time. Thus, the intercept 
is supposed to be variant according to the individual 
but over time. In contrast, the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are constant across individual 
scope and time.
The estimated fixed effects model is represen-
ted in Equation 1.
Yit = αi + β0i + β1γit + β2δit + β2σit + β3Z'it + φ2T2 + 
... + φtTt + eit                                                                                          (1)
Where i = 1 ... n countries and t = year. The 
dependent variable Y is the EPI and the independent 
variables γ , δ and σ are, respectively, the Gini Index, 
Freedom House Index and Polity IV. There is also 
the set of control variables, called Z’. The eit is the 
error term for each country at each point in time and 
the term αi is the fixed effect of the cross-sectional 
unit (country).
The effect of time was also considered, as it 
is believed that the proposed relationship changes 
over the years. Thus, time dummies variables were 
introduced for each year from 2008 to 2016, with 
2007 being the reference category. In equation (1), 
φt is the coefficient of the binary time variable and 
is the year as a binary variable. The t-1 periods 
were considered.
4. Results and discussion
To better understand the relationship between 
inequality, democracy and environmental perfor-
mance, the analysis starts with reduced models. 
Model (1)  included only  the Gini Index, while 
model (2) also included the control variables and 
the effect of time. The results are shown in Table 1. 
While the first model showed a negative association 
between income concentration and environmental 
performance, the second model showed the oppo-
site – both coefficients are statistically significant.
The use of fixed effects models assumes time 
invariant characteristics that can create a bias in 
the explanatory variable and therefore, there is a 
need to control for such effects. Therefore, by in-
corporating the time effect and socioeconomic and 
demographic variables into model (2), a coefficient 
closer to that considered as the net effect of  Gini 
Index on EPI was obtained. The coefficient indicates 
that the higher the inequality, the better would be 
environmental performance. 
The evidence revealed in model (2) refutes, at 
least in part, the equality hypothesis proposed by 
Boyce (1994). Contrary to the arguments proposed 
in Torras and Boyce’s study (1998), the results 
suggest that a better redistribution of income from 
rich to poor individuals worsens the performance of 
environmental indicators. In this sense, the results 
were closer to those found by Scruggs (1998).
The results discussed so far show that when 
inequality is analyzed in the environmental context, 
the evidence converges with the conclusions repor-
ted by Scruggs (1998). However, when only the 
effects of per capita income are observed, as in the 
approach adopted in the EKC literature, the results 
are similar to those reported by Boyce (1994) and 
Torras & Boyce (1998). That is, even though income 
redistribution was not positively associated with 
high scores in the EPI suggesting that egalitarian 
societies are not necessarily more environmentally 
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sustainable, high income levels were related to wor-
se performance regarding pro-environmental action, 
suggesting that wealth is a driver of degradation4. 
However, this result also adds to the discussion that 
greater environmental performance is associated 
with countries’  capacity to spend on technologies, 
systems and policies for mitigate and/or control 
environmental degradation. Possibly countries with 
greater capacity to invest in environmental control 
measures are also those with the best performance 
on the EPI indicators.
When considering the effect of time on model 
(2), we assume that environmental performance is 
modified over the years due to various factors, such 
as technological changes, changes in consumption 
patterns, changes in environmental and economic 
policies, which may or may not be pro-environ-
mental. Since the results indicate highly significant 
coefficients for the time variables from 2010, the 
presence of a time effect is confirmed.
Based on this positive association, it is sug-
gested that during the period 2010-2015 the quality 
of the economy-environment relationship was gra-
dually improving on a global scale. The two years 
that were not statistically significant (2008 and 
2009) represent a period of crisis and post-crisis in 
the world economy, when the priorities in political 
agendas in several countries changed. In this period, 
it may be that environmental issues were neglected, 
given the degree of economic adversity.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the mean EPI 
scores and of the two objectives over the period 
under review. As also indicated by the 2016 EPI Re-
port, countries have made progress in some dimen-
sions, with an emphasis on water quality and basic 
sanitation. Although some indicators are declining, 
particularly in relation to air quality, marine stocks, 
and CO2 emissions, which have slowed progress, 
the overall environmental performance score has 
been improving since 2007. 
4 Iterations between GDP per capita and Gini were tested and it turned out not statistically significant. 



















Industry (% GDP) 0.013(0.015)
HDI 16.2454**(5.354)







TABLE 1 – Reduced models, including only inequality and control 
variables.
Dependent variable: Environmental Performance Index (EPI), fixe-
d-effects models.
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Global environmental improvement is being 
driven by annual increments in the human health 
objective, which, according to Wendling et al (2019), 
is positively correlated with income and prosperity. 
On the other hand, ecosystem vitality, which is ne-
gatively associated with industrialization and urba-
nization, presents greater stability and less progress.
When considering the variables of political 
regime (Polity IV) and level of freedom and indi-
vidual rights (FHI), without the other controls, the 






R² within 0.008 0.539
R² between 0.098 0.118
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p 
<0.05, † p <0.1.
SOURCE: prepared by the authors.
FIGURE 1 – Average Environmental Performance Index Score and its objectives, 2007-2016.
SOURCE: prepared by the authors.
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tration was negative, as illustrated in model (3) of 
Table 2. However, when control and time variables 
are included, models (4) and (5), the relationship be-
comes positive and the magnitude of the coefficients 
becomes comparatively larger. In other words, a less 
unequal society does not necessarily have a better 
society-nature relationship, as suggested in the rese-
arch of Jorgenson, et al. (2016; 2017), Kasuga (2017) 
and Knight, et al. (2017), who point to the current 
and potential consumption pattern as the main factor 
behind environmental degradation.
When separately analyzing the association of 
the political regime variable (Polity IV) with the EPI, 
the three estimated models show that, on average, 
higher levels of democracy are related to lower 
environmental performance scores. That is, there is 
a negative association between democratic political 
regime and environmental performance.
According to Congleton (1992), one of the fac-
tors that explains the negative association found in 
these models is the long-term horizon of environmen-
tal policies. In the political sphere, the time horizon 
directly influences the behavior of political leaders, 
as well as their plans and proposals. Thus, politicians 
with short-term views tend to prioritize actions that 
are perceived as produce results quickly, while rulers 
with long-term perspectives tend to prioritize policies 
that yield results over a longer period.
The studies of Povitkina (2018a; 2018b) are 
in line with Congleton (1992): given the brevity of 
electoral cycles in democratic regimes, leaders tend 
to prioritize short-term policies in order to deliver 
faster results within their mandate, thus favoring 
their chances of being reelected to power. Thus, pro-
-environmental policies, which require longer time 
horizons in terms of planning, action, and outcome, 
are constantly neglected.

















   “Partially free”
   










 “Not free” -1.275***
(0.309)


















Taxes (%  GDP) -0.0243†(0.129)
-0.0235†
(0.129)


















TABLE 2 – Complete models, including control variables.
Dependent variable: Environmental Performance Index (EPI), fixe-
d-effects models
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That is, the effectiveness and efficiency of 
democracy as a political regime are also important 
elements in this debate. Although the liberal-de-
mocratic regime expresses plurality by allowing 
the participation of various social groups in the 
governmental dimension (Povitkina, 2018a), the 
degree of their effectiveness differs between socie-
ties. A democratic government, however corrupt 
or dominated by a particular social group, may 
not guarantee good environmental performance. If 
influential corporations lead the decision-making 
process, individual or smaller-scale interests may be 
put before social interests in greater  environmental 
protection and quality (Dryzek, 1992; Povitkina; 
2018b).
Furthermore, according to Midlarsky (1998), 
if the most powerful groups in government are not 
interested in environmental legislation and in gua-
ranteeing the protection of natural environments, 
democracy as a political regime is failing for this 
purpose. Ehrhard-Martinez et al. (2002), for exam-
ple, found that countries with a democratic regime 
improved their environmental indicators only when 
they displayed what the authors referred to as a 
“strong state capacity”. That is, when the govern-
ment had considerable ability to articulate actions 
with the various entities within society.
Another argument for the non-deterministic 
association between democracy as a political regi-
me is the fragility of democracy itself – even as an 
ideal. However democratic a country may appear by 
virtue of its electoral procedures, many authoritarian 
movements that prioritize the particular interests of 
a specific power group and lean toward corruption 
are camouflaged by democratically elected leaders, 
“weakening the buffers of democracy” (Levitsky & 
Ziblatt, 2018, p. 2).
While Polity IV indicates the degree of institu-
tionalized democracy in the country, the inclusion of 
the individual liberty indicator (FHI) sheds light on 
how some of the liberal principles and democratic 
practices, such as political rights and civil liberties 
(Cunningham, 2009) are also related to environ-
mental performance.
Models (3) and (4) in Table 2 incorporated the 
Freedom House Index with its three response statu-
ses, with “free” as the reference category. However, 
model (3) showed a statistically non-significant 
“not free” category; and for model (4), where the 
control variables were inserted, the “partially free” 
status coefficient was not statistically significant. 
Therefore, it was decided to consider “free” and 
“partially free” as a single category, which is the 
reference category compared to the “not free” status 
in model (5).
The results suggest that when disregarding 
other influencing factors, in model (3), being less 
‘free’ induces better environmental performance. 
However, when socioeconomic variables and the 
effect of time were introduced, in model (4), the 







Observations 1.097 779 779
Number of countries 145 103 103
R² within 0.021 0.562 0.560
R² between 0.018 0.070 0.089
R² total 0.025 0.037 0.051
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p 
<0.05, † p <0.1.
SOURCE: prepared by the authors.
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of freedom and rights are positively associated with 
better performance regarding human protection and 
ecosystem issues as a whole.
These results seem to corroborate Povitkina’s 
(2018a) suggestion that the relationship between 
freedom and environmental quality is multidimen-
sional. The basic argument is that greater freedom 
of expression and the press favors greater access 
to information about current and potential environ-
mental problems, as well as governmental failures 
and inefficient solutions. In addition, greater free-
dom allows for broader debates, favoring feedback 
between society and organizations, corporations and 
parties on necessary decision-making.
Similarly, freedom of association allows 
environmental interest groups to organize themsel-
ves. Together, greater freedom of expression and 
association enable pro-environmental groups to 
protest and articulate in favor of reducing negative 
externalities, both locally and globally (Povitkina, 
2015; 2018a; 2018b).
With wider dissemination of information, 
individual pro-environmental decisions can bring 
about changes not only in everyday life and in the 
pattern of consumption, but also in the sphere of 
electoral voting, inducing preferences for “green” 
political parties that propose actions focusing on 
the environment. Recently, the number of parties 
linked to environmental issue has grown in several 
countries, and their influence is reflected in the 
voting behavior of their populations. 
When analyzing the evidence found in model 
(5), which has a highly significant coefficient for the 
bi-categorical FHI, some interesting finding become 
even more apparent. Democracy as an institutiona-
lized political regime and democracy as defined by 
the extent of political rights and civil liberties have 
inverse relations with environmental performance. 
That is, while higher levels of institutionalized 
democracy do not necessarily suggest higher envi-
ronmental quality, higher levels of freedom suggest. 
This paradox may have been produced by the Polity 
IV indicator, which ranks only regimes based on 
electoral political game, although it does not reveal 
whether democracy is subverted by elected leaders.
The conclusion is that since each nation has 
its own socioeconomic and cultural particularities, 
consequently these differences are also expressed in 
the performance of the political system as a whole. 
Given the complexity and particularities associated 
with each government, it is unrealistic to suggest 
the existence of a unique relationship between 
democracy and global environmental performance.
The tree map in Figure 2 reveals the diversity 
of political profiles found in the sample for 2016. 
Sixty countries (the largest blue box), including 
Canada, Argentina and Brazil, were classified as 
democratic and free. Only 19 were classified as 
autocratic and not free, examples being China, Cuba 
and Iran. The number of anocratic countries, in turn, 
totaled 46, indicating many cases of mixed regimes. 
Of this total, 24 were categorized as non-free, such 
as Venezuela, 21 as partially free, such as Morocco, 
and only Suriname was categorized as free. 
When  dividing countries into “free and de-
mocratic” and “not free and autocratic” profiles, 
different profiles were found regarding environ-
mental performance. In 2016, in the former group, 
52 countries had high EPI scores (70-100), e.g. Fin-
land, while 6 countries had medium scores (50-69), 
e.g. India, and only 2 had scores below 50, namely 
Benin and the Salomon Islands. In the latter group 
of autocratic and non-free countries, 6 had high 
EPI scores, e.g. Cuba, 12 had medium scores, e.g. 
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China, and only one country had a score below 50, 
namely Eritrea. Therefore, the results  suggested 
that free and democratic, as well as autocratic and 
non-free countries, may have both high and low 
environmental performances5.
Considering the Gini index of the series, it was 
found that most of the free and democratic nations 
had high EPI scores and low levels of inequality6, 
e.g. Germany. Brazil and Mexico, on the other 
hand, are examples of democratic and free coun-
tries with high EPI scores, but with high levels of 
income concentration. In contrast, most “non-free 
and autocratic” nations have medium EPI scores, 
and similarly, most countries in this group present 
low levels of inequality, examples being Azerbaijan 
(high EPI and low inequality) and Vietnam (medium 
EPI and low inequality).
5 In this analysis, 32 countries were not analyzed due to insufficient information.
6 A GINI below 40.0 was considered low.
FIGURE 2 – Combination of political regime (Polity IV) and level of freedom (Freedom House Index) – size of boxes representing the number 
of countries.
Note: the brown boxes with no label accounts for: anocratic and free (1 country), autocratic and partially free (1 country), and democratic and 
not free (2 countries).
SOURCE: prepared by the authors.
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This exploratory analysis, therefore, illustra-
tes the paradox revealed by the estimated models: 
higher levels of democracy do not necessarily 
correlate with better environmental performance 
and more egalitarian income distribution. This may 
occur due to the presence of more conservative and 
even autocratic features masked within democracy – 
a conclusion that is reinforced by the fact that only 
the iterations between Gini and the FHI or Polity 
IV in the model have not been statically significant. 
Similarly, in autocratic societies, there may not ne-
cessarily be a disharmonious relationship between 
individuals and the environment, as exemplified by 
Cuba’s efforts in recent years.
Given the diversity of country profiles, which 
include distinct features in terms of the degree of 
freedom, the type of political regime, and the level 
of inequality, the pattern of environmental perfor-
mance is variable. That said, it is argued that the 
performance of the indicators may be more closely 
related to the structuring and articulation between 
the different institutions within each nation - which 
largely reflects the priorities of political agendas and 
varies according to the socioeconomic, political and 
cultural profile and interests of individual citizens - 
than to the type of political regime per se.
5. Conclusions
In order to associate economic and political 
factors in the environmental context, this research 
investigated the influence of political regime, the 
level of political freedoms and civil rights, and the 
degree of income concentration on environmental 
performance on a global scale. The results showed a 
negative relation between democracy and economic 
inequality with environmental performance scores. 
Thus, democracy as a political regime does not ne-
cessarily induce a greater commitment of nations to 
environmental issues. Similarly, reducing income 
inequality does not ensure that the relations between 
society and nature will be more harmonious.
On the other hand, the FHI showed a positive 
association with the EPI: higher levels of political 
freedom and civil rights were linked, on average, to 
better environmental performance. In other words, 
freer countries tend to make stronger commitments 
to the environment.
However, care should be taken when consi-
dering any generalized interpretations regarding 
the investigated relationships. One country may 
be democratic and free, egalitarian, have a high 
EPI score and culturally sustainable habits, such 
as Denmark, but a country may have a similar po-
litical and social status and still have a history of 
development based on environmental pressure for 
emissions, such as Norway.
Thus, it is argued that the relationships esta-
blished between individuals and the environment 
are highly heterogeneous and based on elements 
beyond the limits of the political regime and purely 
macroeconomic issues. That is, it is necessary to 
direct our gaze to even more complex aspects within 
societies, such as their traditions, habits, patterns of 
consumption, and priorities.
These considerations point to the challenges 
of future research in this area. A more detailed look 
at the quality of democracy and its association with 
the levels of individual and collective freedoms is 
required. Similarly, interdisciplinary approaches 
have much to contribute in this area.
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